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In "Interpretations of Life and
Prohibitions against Killing," Thomasine Kushner develops the valuable

disti nction

between zoe and bios,
being alive and having a life. Her aim
is to provide the basis for a more
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rational application of moral rules
against killing. "Having a life," says
Kushner, "means being the subject of
a certain life with its accompanying
history, nexus of personal and social
relationships,
complex
patterns of
psychological characteristics, plus the
whole fabric of events as they happen
to and affect the individual." Beings
who have lives are also "capable of
some degree of
problem solving,
effecting relationships that give satisfaction, benefiting from past experiences to influence present situations,
as well as experiencing and expressing a range of emotions."l
Kushner
suggests
that
bios,
understood in this sense, is the most
rational basis for prohibitions against
killing. She thus opts for a position
intermediate . between that of many
Eastern religions, which often include
all animals (and in the case of Jainism, all living beings) within their
sphere of moral concern, and the
dominant tradition in the West, which
includes only humans.
Kushner does
a n excellent job of s howi ng that
acceptance of this criterion would
require extension of the right to life
to many non-human animals.
There
are, of course, gradations of bios:
some animals
have
more
complex
"biograph.ies" than others, and therefore, in the case of conflict, would be
entitled to preferential treatment, so
far as preserving their lives is concerned.
Kushner's position is thus
consistent with maintaining that human
life in general is of greater value than
animal life, but she shows herself
quite free of speciesist prejudice by
pointing out that a conflict could theoretically arise in which one would be
morally obliged to save the life of a
non-human rather than a human, if
the non-human's life exhibited the
qualities of bios to a greater degree.
The concept of bios is a worthwhile
contribution to value theory and to
the ethical foundation of our duties to
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(many) non-human animals.
In the
present paper, however, Kushner utilizesit to argue a thesis which is not
convincing.
She begins by noting
that the sacredness of life is a principle shared by Eastern and Western
culture. They differ only as to "how
the term life is to be interpreted."
That term, according to Kushner, is
ambiguous, and its ambiguity is the
sou rce
of
differing
prohibitions
against killing.
For the Jains, the
extension of 'life' is all living beings,
while for the Western world it is
solely human beings.
Kushner suggests that a more appropriate extension would be "all beings which have
lives.
11

She thus presents the moral problem of the sacredness of life as
though it were at bottom merely a linguistic or conceptual difficulty. 2
In
her account the diversity of prohibitions against killing is "traceable to
an ambiguity in the term life, and a
more rational basis for such prohibitions can accordi ngly be reached simply th rough analysis and reinterpretation of that term.
11
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But surely this is to get things
backwards.
The ambiguity of the
term 'life', as used by different cultures, derives from their radically
differing val ue systems, not the other
way around. To clarify the term 'life'
is merely to point out these differences, not to resolve them. In point
of fact,
Kushner is not primarily
engaged in linguistic or conceptual
analysis at all, but in value theory.
Her argument is synthetic, for it
involves the recommendation of an
alternative val ue system as a basis for
prohibitions against killing.
But in
order to establish her claim that bIos
is a preferable criterion for preservation of life, it would be necessary to
explicate the true foundations of what
she ta kes to be erroneous concepts of
life, to show that these are, in fact,
false, and to prove the the concept of
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bios is preferable.

To what extent is
she successful in doing this?
Kushner's explication of the Jainist
and Buddhist views on killing is quite
lucid so far as it goes but fails to
make clear what the true basis for
these positions is. The greater inclusiveness
of
Eastern
prohibitions
against killing is typically rooted in
fundamental metaphysical conceptions
of a unified totality of being quite
alien
to the dualistic,
creationist
metaphysic of the Christian West.
The belief in reincarnation also often
plays a decisive role in this regard,
particularly in Hi ndu ism.
Kush ner's
ready dismissal of Eastern prohibitions
against killing of all animal life as
morally "counter-intuitive" is rather
parochial. It may be counter-intuitive
to us Westerners, but it would by no
means be so to a Hindu, a Buddhist,
or a Jain.
For a devotee of the
Krishna consciousness movement, for
example, the universal ban on killing.
of animal· life is rooted in the belief
that all animals possess self-identical
souls.
"Having a life," in Kushner's
sense, is from this viewpoint by no
means a. prerequisite for having a
soul, and ergo not a prerequisite for
respecting an animal's life.
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non-animal, living beings (e.g., the
effect on humans, other animals, or
the eco-system, aesthetic concerns,
etc.), there remains in sensitive persons a residue of outrage which can
only be accounted for in terms of the
"interests" of those beings themselves. That the natu re of existence
compels us to kill some living beings
in order to survive does not prove
that we are not morally obliged to
avoid killing whenever possible.
Two of the prominent objections in
the Western tradition to the granting
of rights to animals are that for a
being to have rights it must be capable of asserting those rights, and that
for a being to be the beneficiary of
an obligation, it must be capable of
fulfilling similar obligations in return.
If it is not capable of this, then we
can have no duties toward it and, a
fortiori,
it can
have no
rights.
Kushner attacks these positions using
the so-called "argument from marginal
cases."
The case of human infants
and the mentally retarded would seem
to suggest that the capabi.lity of
asserting rights or fulfilling moral
obligations is not a prerequisite for
the possession of rights, assuming
that we are willing to accord rights to
these humans.

Moreover, even if we grant, from a
Western perspective, the greater value
of bios over zoe, it is not clear why
zoe should thereby be completely
excluded from moral consideration.
It
wou Id seem equally consistent with
Kushner's general position to maintain
that all animals (or even all living
beings) have an intrinsic right to life,
although those whose lives have the
quality of bios have a greater right to
life.

The
same
argument
could
be
applied, of course, to the various
other criteria wh ich a re often presented for denying non-human animals
rights in general, or the right to life
Implicit in the attribuin particular.
tion of rights to infants and mentally
retarded humans is the recognition
that the criteria ordinarily employed
for denying animals the right to life
are too high.

There IS some reason to believe
that such a position is more nearly
correct than the one which Kushner
adopts. When we exclude, for example, all indirect grounds for moral
objection to the gratuitous killing of

Kushner fails in her paper, however, to prove that bios is the correct
criterion. Since in many cases infants
and mentally retarded persons fail to
exhibit the qualities of bios, the
argument from marginal cases would
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seem to suggest the appropriateness
of a lower criterion than bios as the
basis for the right to life.
Nor is
Kushner's explanation as to why bios
is valuable very compelli ng.
More
importantly, she ma kes no attempt to
show how such value, if it exists,

entails a right to life. In spite of its
valuable contribution to the elucidation
of the problem and the broadening of
our moral horizons, Kushner's article
thus fails to provide a final answer to
the question, "What life is sacred?"

George P. Cave
Trans-Species Unlimited
NOTES
Kushner, p. 151.
2.
Kushner never makes it clear in her article whether she thinks she is
doing conceptual or linguistic analysis.

